## Election Turns Case Activity

### Format/Explanation

First, read through the cards in this document.

Then, assume one of the aff case structures below. Each student should decide what 1NC impact module they would have read for the Clinton Good/Trump Bad Election DA. Each student should then prepare a 2NC/1NR DA overview in which they argue that the DA outweighs and turns the case. The max time for this overview is 45 seconds.

1 — the aff read BIT (CFIUS reform in exchange for narrowing of China’s negative list) with a Protectionism Advantage (protectionism impact and economy impact) and Relations Advantage (SCS conflict and warming impacts).

2 — the aff read Taiwan Grand Bargain (typical plan) with a Nuclear War Advantage and Relations Advantage (laundry list and warming impacts).

3 — the aff read Cybersecurity (typical plan) with a Cybersecurity Advantage and Relations Advantage (Living Standards and Warming impacts).

4 — the aff read BIT (unilateral CFIUS reform) with a Relations Advantage (SCS and ECS conflict impacts) and a Chinese Growth Advantage (CCP collapse/lashout impact).

Each student should prepare an overview vs. each of these setups. We will do several in front of the lab.

## China-Related Impacts

### Trump Causes Asian War

#### Trump would cause escalatory Asian wars — outweighs and turns case.

Jackson 15 — Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Strategist and Policy Adviser focused on the Asia-Pacific at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds a Ph.D. in World Politics from The Catholic University of America, 2015 (“Donald Trump's Asia Policy Would be a Disaster,” *The Diplomat*, September 11th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/donald-trumps-asia-policy-would-be-a-disaster/>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Try to imagine what would happen if Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump decided U.S. policy toward Asia. U.S. presidential elections almost never hinge on foreign policy, but it’s worth pondering how a Trump administration might impact the world’s wealthiest and most populous region given his seeming nationalist-mercantilist philosophy of governance and transactional view of foreign policy. What would Asia become if Trump became president? In short: it would be a disaster.

Although he gives us only occasional glimpses via impolitic musings, we know several things about Trump’s orientation toward foreign policy, and Asia in particular. He believes in having a large, modern, and capable military. He believes in wielding the threat of force but not so much in the use of it. And he believes allies—especially Japan and South Korea—free-ride on U.S. commitments, which he claims has two consequences. One is that Americans are suckers for maintaining a forward military presence when they don’t need to; the other is that these allies are “eating our lunch” in trade imbalances and economic growth because they don’t spend enough on their own defense.

From these glimpses we can deduce a few major implications for Asia policy. All of them are disastrous.

First, Trump would likely withdraw the U.S. military from Asia and instead beef up a garrison force on U.S. territory, which would have enormous strategic consequences. Forward military presence does more than just assure allies and deter aggressors. It enables the United States to respond quickly to a crisis wherever it may be. If U.S. forces had to fly and sail from the continental United States to respond when its interests were threatened, it would show up to everything a day late and a dollar short. One of the central insights from deterrence literature has been that it’s much harder to reverse an action once taken than preventing the action in the first place. Yet if the United States is slow to deploy because of sheer distance, then every expansionist or revisionist actor in the international system would be able to present us with faits accompli. This means that if bad guys are conducting preventive strikes, launching guerrilla wars, conquering territory, or controlling sea lanes near them, the United States would either have to simply acquiesce, or challenge them after they’ve secured themselves and attempt to reverse their achievements at great cost.

Second, by eliminating U.S. forward presence in Asia, a Trump administration military would willingly give up escalation control. Although far from an exact science, escalation control requires being able to engage an adversary in a crisis or conflict without resorting to total annihilation or nuclear war. The total war approach was already tried in the form of President Eisenhower’s massive retaliation doctrine in the 1950s, which planted the seeds of a nuclear-armed China and North Korea, catalyzed the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union, and left the United States ill-equipped to deal with real-world crises and low-intensity conflict, as repeatedly occurred with China in the 1950s. Even worse, if your solution to every military problem—no matter how small—is nuclear annihilation, other countries will eventually stop believing your threats or you’ll be forced to make good on that nuclear annihilation promise. Either outcome would be catastrophic.

As a corollary, if U.S. forces are based at home, then every crisis or conflict would represent a 21st century version of the massive retaliation doctrine because no tailored solutions, deterrence forces, or small troop deployments would be possible, because they’d have to first navigate across the Pacific Ocean to be relevant, by which time the outcome of a crisis or conflict may already be decided. A home-based U.S. force could only influence international outcomes by threatening massive retribution, which would immediately escalate any situation to an unacceptable and irresponsible level. As China seeks dominion over the South China Sea—through which $5 trillion of trade passes each year—a U.S. military absent from the region will have no sway over events. And if China succeeds in establishing de facto military domination of the South China Sea, it will be the United States, alongside allies and partners, who will lose freedom of navigation rights and the ability to engage in global commerce unencumbered.

Finally, Trump’s stance toward allies like Japan and South Korea would not simply wreck those alliances, but destabilize Northeast Asia’s precarious balance. Without a U.S. alliance, both states are dramatically more likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, which destroys the possibility of preserving a nuclear nonproliferation regime, and consequently would make it impossible to prevent other determined states, like Iran, from going nuclear. And with the United States walking away from its clear commitments to Japan and South Korea, there would be no credible prospect of the United States coming to the aid of Taiwan, where U.S. commitments are more ambiguous. China’s determination to absorb Taiwan—even against the latter’s will—would face dramatically fewer inhibitions if China knew Taiwan would not have U.S. backing.

More than simply abandoning Japan, Trump seems to indicate we would enter a confrontational phase in U.S.-Japan relations. He blames Japan for not spending enough on defense, but Japan’s closest neighbors have long been wary of a militarily “normal” Japan. Without the United States, moreover, a Japan with a large and advanced military may push South Korea—whose diplomatic relations with Japan have long been tense—into alignment with China. And although Trump makes a bogeyman out of U.S. trade imbalances with Japan, he overlooks the fact that U.S. trade relations with Japan benefit the United States; Toyota, for example, manufactures cars for the U.S. market in many low-income areas in the United States, providing tens of thousands of jobs for Americans. Trade imbalances are an abstraction; jobs are real.

Of South Korea, Trump asks, “…how long will we go on defending South Korea from North Korea without payment?” Never mind that South Korea does share the cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea, that the South does contribute to U.S. security interests around the world, or that the anti-Americanism in North Korean identity means we’re defending ourselves from North Korea in addition to the South. Because we maintain a military presence in South Korea, deterrence has prevailed. Yet Trump says, “…the young man from North Korea starts acting up…we immediately get our ships going. We get our aircraft. We get nothing for this.” Avoiding large-scale casualties or chemical warfare is not “nothing;” it’s peace, however precarious. Perhaps Trump would prefer to see a second Korean War?

Trump’s slogan is “Make America great again.” But willfully ceding U.S. global leadership isn’t greatness. Abandoning the global liberal order to others isn’t greatness. Allowing large-scale atrocities or the end of a generation of peace in Asia when you have the ability to prevent it isn’t greatness. And neither is reneging on U.S. commitments. Far from being “great,” Trump’s Asia policy is morally, economically, and strategically unconscionable.

#### Trump crushes Asian stability — comparatively larger internal link.

Vu 16 — Khang Vu, Analyst from New London, New Hampshire who studies International Relations, China, and International Political Economy, 2016 (“Why A Trump Presidency Would Be Bad For Asia,” *The Diplomat*, April 7th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-a-trump-presidency-would-be-bad-for-asia/>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

As the race to the White House is heating up, Asian countries are paying close attention to the candidates’ foreign policy platforms. For the last few weeks, international headlines have focused on Donald Trump’s vision of a nuclearized Northeast Asia and his proposal to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea and Japan if the two countries do not contribute more to the alliance. For the most part, scholars and strategists have denounced Trump’s plan. However, despite these negative remarks, primary results have shown that Trump is undoubtedly the Republican front-runner for the presidency. Even though the final result of the presidential campaign is not decided until November, Trump’s negative impacts on Asia are too clear to be ignored.

Trump’s foreign policy can be broken down into three main components. First, he seeks to limit the scope of U.S. foreign policy, from a major international player to an isolationist. Second, Trump wants to withdraw U.S. commitment to America’s East Asian allies, at the potential cost of Japan and South Korea acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And third, Trump wants to conduct foreign policy as a form of doing business, which means America must get benefits from any relationship with another country. A thorough examination at each of these components will provide a comprehensive look at potential consequences of Trump’s policies towards Asia.

First, the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II has always been the desire to construct and safeguard a liberal world order that every country is required to adhere to. Widespread U.S. interventions into global issues have strengthened the foundation for such a rule-based political order, and the presence of the United States has constrained the rise of new non-Western countries that seek to upset international standards and norms. Unfortunately, a Trump presidency is likely to pull America out of its role, giving rising powers like China greater leeway to impose its vision of order on neighboring countries. Moreover, such a decline in U.S. influence will send a dangerous signal to its East Asian allies that America is no longer willing to come to their defense, prompting them to resort to necessary security measures in order to make up for the loss of American commitment.

As a consequence of American isolationism, Trump has suggested withdrawing troops from South Korea and Japan and allowing the two countries to develop their own nuclear weapons. Trump’s intention is based on two major assumptions. First, upgrading and maintaining a large, modern conventional force is not an effective deterrent compared to developing a nuclear capability. Second, allowing South Korea and Japan to have nukes will relieve America of its responsibility as a “nuclear umbrella,” preventing the U.S. from engaging in a nuclear war with North Korea.

However, these two assumptions are unconvincing when more closely examined. American troop presence in South Korea is meant to prevent the escalation of conflicts between the two Koreas (deterring the North and constraining the South), and to provide U.S. Army with the capability to manage potential crises on the Korean peninsula. The withdrawal of U.S. troops is likely to damage the security structure and simultaneously reduce American operation capability in times of conflicts. Moreover, the lack of American security commitment will push South Korea closer to China, which gives China more incentives to enhance its military stature in East Asia, something the United States must avoid.

Second, allowing South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear capabilities will deal a critical blow to U.S. attempts at denuclearizing North Korea. Pyongyang is not willing to negotiate giving up its nuclear weapons now, much less when watching its enemies get their own. More dangerously, the escalation of a nuclear arms race coupled with American isolationism will undoubtedly increase the chances for miscalculations among Pyongyang, Seoul, and Tokyo. In this situation, maintaining the American security guarantee is the only way to prevent a war in Northeast Asia, a method that has been effective since the end of the Korean War.

The third component in Trump’s foreign policy will also impair the credibility of Washington’s “pivot to Asia” amid increasing China’s aggression in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. America’s pivot is meant to provide its allies and partners with reassurance of a stable political, economic, and security environment. This commitment requires the United States to conduct its foreign policy in a win-win manner with Asian countries, and Washington must demonstrate itself as a reliable partner in exchange for more interactions and cooperation. However, Trump’s business-style foreign policy will turn the pivot into a zero-sum game between the United States and Asian nations, which would raise doubts about Washington’s true intentions and consistency.

For example, Trump’s recent demand for Seoul and Tokyo to pay more to the coalition with Washington has turned a treaty commitment into a form of win-lose relationship, which prompted these states to clarify their contributions and reassess their affairs with the United States. Other Asian nations with interests in the U.S. pivot are likely to watch America’s relations with South Korea and Japan in order to determine how dependable Washington is. In the case of a Trump’s victory, the “pivot to Asia” will be a failed endeavor, causing Asian nations to seek for their own means of defense against China.

The 21st century has been described as the Asian century. Therefore, the United States need to adopt necessary policies to ensure peaceful economic, political, and security development of its Asian allies and partners. Donald Trump’s foreign policy of isolationism, nuclear proliferation, and zero-sum relationships is completely at odds with America’s “pivot to Asia.” If America wants to be great again, it will need to strengthen its commitment with the liberal structure it has created, and broaden its cooperation with regional players. Playing the role of a global peacekeeper is a must, not a choice for Washington.

#### Trump’s policies guarantee disaster in Asia.

Alter 16 — Jonathan Alter, Columnist for *The Daily Beast*, Analyst for MSNBC, 2016 (“As President, Trump’s ‘Asia Pivot’ Will Be Toward War,” *The Daily Beast*, June 4th, Available Online at <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/04/as-president-trump-s-asia-pivot-will-be-toward-war.html>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Hillary Clinton came out swinging at Donald Trump Thursday, making specific reference to the scary prospect of him taking possession of the nuclear codes: “It’s not hard to imagine Donald Trump leading us into a war just because somebody got under his very thin skin.”

The Trump apologists and rationalizers coming out of the GOP woodwork, which now includes Speaker Paul Ryan, will spend from now until November arguing that Trump is the dove and Clinton the hawk. He’s a non-interventionist, we’re told. His slogan, he says, is “America First,” the moniker of the often-anti-Semitic isolationists who supported appeasing Adolf Hitler in the late 1930s.

We all know how well that kept the peace.

The reason Trump will likely get us into a war (or two or three) was captured by Trump himself in his recent interview with Megyn Kelly of Fox. “I’m a counterpuncher, you understand. I’m responding. I respond by maybe, times 10,” he told Kelly. “But in just about all cases I’ve been responding to what they did to me.”

The problem for all of us is that when you’re president, “did to me” becomes “did to America.” Trump’s narcissistic victimhood will quickly transmogrify into the bruised honor of nationhood, which is often the prelude to war.

“He swings from isolationism to military adventurism within the space of one sentence,” reads a letter attacking Trump that was signed by 120 foreign policy experts.

So when North Korean leader Kim Jong Un mouths off at the Trump administration, or a Chinese naval captain doesn’t take kindly to “territorial violations” in the South China Sea, the new America president will “respond times 10.”

Bet on it.

In the meantime, Trump’s notorious comments about barring Muslims from American shores have a familiar ring. Consider the history of Asian immigration. Chinese “coolie” labor first arrived the United States in the early 1850s to help with the Gold Rush, and thousands more came to build the transcontinental railroad. But the 1870s and 1880s brought anti-Chinese pogroms across the West and more than 200 lynchings.

The first Trumpian legislation—The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 —barred Chinese from entering the United States. The so-called Asian Barred Zone Act of 1917 extended the prohibitions on entry to most other Asian countries (as well as homosexuals, “idiots,” polygamists, anarchists, and all immigrants over the age of 16 who were illiterate). The Cable Act of 1922 effectively revoked the citizenship of any American woman who married an Asian alien. It wasn’t until the Immigration Act of 1965—an underrated part of the Great Society—that Asian immigrants were put on equal footing with Caucasians and allowed into the United States in any numbers.

For decades, politicians and newspapers referred darkly to what Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany first called “the yellow peril”—Asian hordes bent on infecting Caucasians with their “disease.” As with eugenics and other racist fads of the time, elites made anti-Asian prejudice respectable. In his 1920 book The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy, Lathrop Stoddard, an eminent Harvard historian, argued that Asians were bent on taking over the Western world. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 made hating “buck-toothed Japs” a thoroughly American phenomenon.

Trump knows better than to utter the crude slurs of Spiro Agnew, who got in trouble in 1968 when he was Richard Nixon’s running mate for calling a Baltimore Sun reporter a “fat Jap.”

But he can’t help using a harsh “Ch” when pronouncing “China” that makes it sound like a curse, mocking the accents of “smart” Asian negotiators (“We want deal”), and assuming Asian-Americans are foreigners.

When Joseph Choe, a 20-year-old Harvard economics major, got up at a New Hampshire event last fall to correct him on his false claim that South Korea paid “nothing” to the United States for its defense, Trump cut him off:

“Are you from South Korea?”

“I’m not. I was born in Texas, raised in Colorado,” Choe replied.

Twenty years ago, the Asian-American vote—reflecting the affluence of that community— was 70 percent Republican. Today, it’s 75 percent Democratic, and the explanation offered by Asian-American political analysts is that Republicans more than Democrats tend to assume someone like Joseph Choe isn’t American. These citizens feel that social exclusion, and they vote accordingly, which is another reason California (where Asian-Americans make up 12 percent of the electorate) is out of reach for the GOP.

Even when Trump has a point, as he does on burden-sharing, his failure to understand the context is disastrous. The hundreds of millions of dollars that both Japan and South Korea pay the United States to house and feed U.S. troops don’t fully cover the costs to U.S. taxpayers, but Trump’s bluster is actually making it harder to get them to pay more.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is trying to reform and expand the Japanese military so that it pays more for itself and helps the United States deter Chinese aggression. But the Japanese people have always been conspiracy-minded and many now believe their government and the United States have struck a secret deal to turn Japan into a nuclear state. This, in turn, strengthens the political position of Japanese nationalists, descendants of the Tojo crowd.

If Trump knew anything about Japanese nationalists and their often hysterical anti-American rhetoric, he wouldn’t be so eager for them to have their fingers on the button.

Trump is equally clueless on trade, where his proposal for a 45 percent tariff would set off a trade war that would impoverish everyone. Trump said last week: “Who the hell cares about a trade war?” Try the estimated 10-20 million Americans who would lose their jobs when our trading partners retaliate and wreck our export markets. Of Japan, he says, “They’re killing us!”, even though the last time that country was prosperous (i.e., “winning”) was 20 years ago.

Of course the hypocrisy of Trump bashing American companies for off-shoring knows no bounds. The Donald J. Trump Collection makes suits, shirts, eyeglasses, perfume and cufflinks in factories across Asia and Central America. Most Trump neckties are made in China, which also manufactures 354 items for his daughter Ivanka’s line of clothing.

Trump may be right that trade talks between China and the United States are like the Patriots and Tom Brady “play[ing] your high school football team.”

Trouble is, he’s lying about those talks. Trump says the Trans-Pacific Partnership “was designed for China to come in, as they always do, through the back door and totally take advantage of everyone.” In fact, the TPP, which explicitly does not include China, was designed to make sure that the United States set the liberal, mostly pro-labor trade standards for Asia before the Chinese get a chance to set their own authoritarian trade rules.

After he forces Mexico to build a wall, rounds up 11 million immigrants, kills the wives and children of suspected terrorists, and renegotiates the national debt (thereby eliminating the dollar as the reserve currency of the world and cratering the global economy), Trump will turn his attention to Asia.

“We’re gonna have great relationships,” he says of our Asian allies. Good luck with that.

### They Say: “Trump Causes Asian War”

#### Trump *won’t* cause Asian war — too many incentives for peace.

Bremmer 16 — Ian Bremmer, President and Founder of Eurasia Group—a global political risk research and consulting firm, Global Research Professor at New York University, Founding Chairman of the Global Agenda Council on Geopolitical Risk at the World Economic Forum, Harold J. Newman Distinguished Fellow in Geopolitics at the Asia Society Policy Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University, 2016 (“Trump and the World: What Could Actually Go Wrong,” *Politico*, June 3rd, Available Online at <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/2016-donald-trump-international-foreign-policy-global-risk-security-guide-213936>, Accessed 07-05-2016)

2. Asia’s geopolitics

China isn’t the only country in the midst of a delicate and dangerous domestic economic reform process. Japan’s Shinzo Abe and India’s Narendra Modi are hoping to avoid confrontations with China that undermine efforts to stoke growth. The South China Sea remains a hot spot worth watching, but Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia can’t afford a direct confrontation with Beijing. Leaders of all these countries will sometimes saber-rattle for short-term political gain, but actual conflict is in no one’s interests. President Trump and newly elected President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines have enough in common to build a solid relationship. The loss of the TPP would hurt Japan and a number of South Asian countries, but that will make stable relations with China only that much more important for them. Asian leaders will watch President Trump closely, but the risk that any of them will allow push to come to shove is lower than many fear.

#### Trump *won’t* destabilize Asia.

Pillalamarri 16 — Akhilesh Pillalamarri, Columnist at *The Diplomat*, former Assistant Editor at *The National Interest* and Editorial Assistant at *The Diplomat*, holds an M.A. in Security Studies from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2016 (“Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy: Implications for Asia,” *The Diplomat*, April 29th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/donald-trumps-foreign-policy-implications-for-asia/>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

On Wednesday, Donald Trump gave a long awaited speech on foreign policy at the Center for the National Interest (CFTNI) in Washington, D.C., laying out what he characterized as “a new foreign policy direction.” While the foreign policy views of Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party’s front runner, are well known–she is a firm believer in the continuation and spread of the American-led, liberal international order–Trump’s speech was a long awaited articulation of his views.

While Trump’s foreign policy views are not as fully developed as Clinton’s–or any of the other remaining candidates from both parties–they deserve close examination, as he is the front-runner of the Republican Party. They certainly do not merit the mockery and accusations of incoherence that they are being subjected to.

I do not endorse Trump or support his views as pertaining to a host of domestic and civil society issues. It is unfortunate that good ideas are being articulated in a haphazard manner by someone as polarizing as Trump. Yet Trump’s foreign policy ideas are important and need to be taken seriously because they inject a much needed dose of realism back into the U.S. foreign policy debate, which is too often influenced by neoconservatives on the right and liberal internationalists on the left, who in practice share similar approaches. As Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of The National Interest, which is published by CFTNI, pointed out, Trump:

is having a salutary effect in forcing open a long-overdue debate in the GOP over foreign policy. Magazines like mine have long urged the GOP to confront its tawdry history in Iraq and to take a second look at the foreign policy approach espoused by the likes of Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and George H.W. Bush. Trump is a far more blunt instrument, but the appeal of someone who can rip away the moth-eaten drapery that has occluded the GOP from accepting basic realities about American foreign policy seems obvious.

It is Trump’s explicit goal to replace “ideology with strategy,” and end a U.S. foreign policy program that since the Cold War truly has veered off course, as old notions of the balance of power and national interest were discarded in an attempt to remake the world. This leads to both a waste of resources and a lack of clarity in understanding the goals of U.S. foreign policy. Most importantly, Trump realizes the mistakes of nation building and overextended alliances. While figures like Senator Lindsey Graham believe this demonstrates Trump’s lack of understanding of “the role America plays in the world,” I believe that at the instinctual level, it actually shows greater common sense from Trump than most of his party. Trump gets that the United States’ role in the world is now “democracy promotion, multilateralism, [and] security guarantees,” and wants to change this.

Contrary to the now-habitual belief of many in Washington, it is not necessary for the United States to “proactively shape the world” in order for it to achieve the global conditions needed for it to prosper or for the global commons to be kept open for all nations. In fact, attempting to shoehorn a U.S.-led order throughout the world is both counterproductive and impossible. As my co-author and I pointed out earlier this month, it is possible to maintain a global order favorable to the United States in a much less intrusive manner, as the British Empire was able to for a century, merely by patrolling the seas and controlling important chokepoints, and preserving the balance of power, all while leading by example. After all, despite not changing its political structure, China opened its economy and its people can mostly live their daily lives as they please, leading to increased global growth.

In Asia, the implications of Trump’s foreign policy would be an end to the current conception of the “Asia Pivot” as it stands, as Trump would draw back from commitments to allies. I have previously argued that the Asia Pivot should be limited, both for the sake of the United States, economically and strategically, and the region. Without a pivot, China would feel less boxed in and reactive. At the same time, a better balance of power in the region would come into being as countries like Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia step up their capabilities, leading to a firmer armed peace. There is no doubt that an advanced economy such as Japan could shoulder its defense burdens eventually if it so chose, and a strong Japan or a strong Indonesia fiercely defending their own turfs would certainly give pause to China or any other potentially aggressive power.

A country such as India, which is not dependent on the United States for its security, is already in a much better position for making its own regional security decisions. Moreover, without a carte blanche from the United States, countries in Asia would be more inclined to resolve festering disputes, rather than operating on the assumption that every inch of territory should be considered inviolable under the notion of the integrity of national sovereignty.

While not fleshed out well, many of Trump’s views, if implemented through experienced advisors, could lead to some welcome changes in the world order and benefit U.S. foreign policy. At the very least, he has started a welcome debate at the highest levels of U.S. politics. Perhaps 19th century notions of balance of power and less intrusiveness in the internal arrangements of other countries are a better way to go than present attempts at liberal internationalism.

### They Say: “Trump Hurts China’s Economy”

#### Both candidates will adopt policies that undermine Chinese growth.

Bradsher 16 — Keith Bradsher, Hong Kong Bureau Chief of *The New York Times* covering Asian business, economic, political, and science news, 2016 (“In Trade Stances Toward China, Clinton and Trump Both Signal a Chill,” *New York Times*, June 29th, Available Online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/business/international/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-trade-china.html?_r=0>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Millions of jobs in China and across the region require the continued willingness of the United States to rely overwhelmingly on imports to supply American families with everything from the clothes they wear to the smartphones they carry.

Rapid economic growth in China and the development of a strong consumer market had seemed to reduce the country’s need for huge exports to the American market. But China’s economy has recently slowed, hurting domestic players from small exporters to large steel makers.

Weaker growth at home has made it all the more important for China to maintain a large trade surplus with the United States, selling more to consumers and businesses there than it buys. For years, China has exported four times as much to the United States as it imports, and it continues to do so.

“If there are tougher trade policies from the United States,” said Shen Jianguang, an economist at Mizuho Securities Asia, “that will dampen Chinese exports.”

The candidates plan to take direct aim at the two countries’ trade gap.

They want to label China as a currency manipulator that undervalues the renminbi to help its exporters win sales in overseas markets. They want to file more trade cases against China and impose more tariffs. They want to investigate how the Chinese government subsidizes businesses. They also want to rethink big trade deals.

#### China would retaliate *either way*.

Bradsher 16 — Keith Bradsher, Hong Kong Bureau Chief of *The New York Times* covering Asian business, economic, political, and science news, 2016 (“In Trade Stances Toward China, Clinton and Trump Both Signal a Chill,” *New York Times*, June 29th, Available Online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/business/international/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-trade-china.html?_r=0>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

If the candidates’ ideas became policy, China would almost certainly retaliate in some fashion. American exports, while sharply smaller than those China sends in the other direction, are a potential focus. Beijing has proved especially adept in the past at targeting American exports from swing states in presidential elections and closely fought congressional districts, maximizing its leverage in the political process even if the economic effects were limited.

### They Say: “Trump Places Tariff On China”

#### Trump *can’t implement* his tariff plan — multiple checks and China doesn’t take it seriously.

Lincicome 16 — Scott Lincicome, International Trade Attorney at White & Case, LLP with extensive experience in trade litigation before the United States Department of Commerce, the U.S. International Trade Commission, the U.S. Court of International Trade, the European Commission, and the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Body, Adjunct Scholar at the Cato Institute, Visiting Lecturer at Duke University, holds a J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law, 2016 (“Almost Everything Donald Trump Says About Trade With China Is Wrong,” *The Federalist*, January 20th, Available Online at <http://thefederalist.com/2016/01/20/almost-everything-donald-trump-says-about-trade-with-china-is-wrong/>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Presidents Can’t Make Trade Policy Themselves

Beyond Trump’s erroneous premise, there’s also the little problem of actually imposing his plan under U.S. law and global trade rules. First and most obviously, the president can’t just slap a tariff on Chinese goods, regardless of whether he tells the Treasury Department to declare China a “currency manipulator” (a superficial action that, contrary to Trump’s online plan, isn’t simple and doesn’t permit the imposition of duties).

The U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 8) gives Congress the sole authority to impose tariffs on foreign-made goods (i.e., “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”), so Trump would have to get congressional approval for his big China plan. Considering that the most protectionist Congress in decades couldn’t even pass legislation making currency undervaluation an illegal subsidy (and fretted for months over whether the bill was consistent with the WTO), does Trump really think this current Congress—which failed to pass a similar measure—would agree to his far-more-aggressive plan? C’mon, man.

Second, several U.S. laws govern the imposition of remedial tariffs on Chinese (and other) imports, and these laws have strict procedural, evidentiary, and substantive requirements that can’t just be ignored, even by the president.

Illegally dumped or subsidized imports from China (and other countries) are governed by U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duty (CVD) laws, respectively, while market-distorting surges in fairly traded imports from all countries fall under the U.S. safeguards law. President Trump’s tariff would totally (and unlawfully) circumvent these laws. As already noted, U.S. law also currently doesn’t allow for using CVD actions to combat alleged currency manipulation.

Finally, the Trump tariff would be blatantly inconsistent with two of the United States’ most fundamental obligations under WTO agreements: (i) Most Favored Nation (GATT Article I—the principle that a WTO member must treat imports from all other members equally) and (ii) the United States’ tariff bindings (GATT Article II—the rule that a WTO Member cannot impose tariffs above the “bound rate” set forth in its tariff schedule).

Such an obvious violation of WTO rules would make for the easiest WTO dispute in the organization’s 20-year history, have serious consequences for the United States (as we’ll discuss next), and would all but ensure that China wouldn’t take Trump’s threat seriously. Maybe President Trump plans to withdraw from the WTO and thereby subject U.S. exporters and investors to high tariffs and other discriminatory barriers WTO rules bar? Good luck, as they say, with all that.

#### Trump’s China trade policies *won’t* kill the economy.

Fletcher 16 — Ian Fletcher, Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America—a nationwide grass-roots organization dedicated to fixing America’s trade policies, former Adjunct Fellow at the San Francisco office of the U.S. Business and Industry Council—a Washington think tank, 2016 (“No, Trump’s Tariff Wouldn’t Crash The Economy,” *The Huffington Post*, June 23rd, Available Online at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/no-trumps-tariff-wouldnt-crash-the-economy_b_9876630.html>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Hillary Clinton has been accusing Donald Trump of having economic plans that would crash the U.S. economy.

There’s a NY Times story about the underlying economic analysis here. (Google the article title and enter via Google if you’re not a subscriber to the Times’s paywall.)

The underlying report from Moody’s Analytics, a mainstream economics firm, is here. The lead author is Mark Zandi, who used to advise Sen. John McCain and Barack Obama, so its presumed bias is anti-Trump. He has also endorsed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the economic models in support of which have been shown to be wrong.

The report concerns three big issues: taxes, immigration, and foreign trade. Now the first two aren’t my area of expertise, so I’ll leave any arguments about them to the experts. But the third is, so let me explain why I think these guys have it wrong.

Before we begin, it’s necessary to get clear on the fact that, frankly, a lot of what Mr. Trump says is obviously just campaign rhetoric. So no, we shouldn’t take literally the idea of a 45 percent tariff on Chinese goods, which the candidate has proposed.

Does this make The Donald a liar? Well, let’s remember that when Pres. Obama was running against Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primaries in 2008, he touted a version of heath reform that was supposedly superior because it lacked the individual mandate to buy insurance. That was obviously a nice piece of campaigning (he won) but was a) the precise opposite of what Obama did in office, and b) an obviously impossible proposal given the structure of healthcare reform. So this is basically par for the course in politics. I wish it were otherwise, but there it is.

And don’t even get me started on Hillary’s rhetoric.

So the correct interpretation of Trump’s tough words on trade is, “I’m going to impose a get-tough policy,” not any particular tariff level. The president can’t set tariffs on his own, and (as Trump has said in other contexts) the 45 percent proposal may just be a negotiating stance designed to bring Beijing to heel. (His actual proposal was for a 45 percent tariff until China lets its currency float freely on international markets, which tends to support this interpretation.)

Moody’s interpretation of the 45 percent proposal (even if one grants the unlikely premise that it should be taken literally) is also unacceptably crude. They write:

The U.S. imports nearly $500 billion in goods a year from China, and another almost $300 billion from Mexico, accounting for approximately 35 percent of total U.S. non-petroleum goods imports... Slapping a 45 percent tariff on Chinese imports and 35 percent on non-petroleum Mexican imports thus increases overall goods import prices by approximately 15 percent. This in turn lifts overall U.S. consumer prices by almost three percent at its peak...

For one thing, they’re ignoring the basic economic concept of elasticity. In a nutshell, prices wouldn’t respond in a linear fashion as described. Profit margins would get compressed, domestic competitors and other foreign nations would move in, and prices wouldn’t move by the amount of the tariff. (The report perfunctorily mentions these issues, but its math doesn’t appear to take them into account.)

For another, they’re forgetting that a tariff offsets other taxes. So if tariff revenue finances, say, a cut in income tax (Trump has indeed proposed one), then the net cost to consumers is zeroed out (pace secondary effects).

So no, a tariff is not necessarily inflationary. And in an economic environment where inflation is so low that central banks are unable to cut interest rates because they can’t go (more than a crumb) below zero, else people would hoard cash, worrying about inflation is not especially rational right now anyway.

Just so you know, I’m not the only one pooh-poohing the idea that Trump’s tariff would bring disaster. The liberal Nobelist Paul Krugman wrote this,

Yes, I know there’s a Moody’s study claiming that Trumponomics would be a yuuge job destroyer, but I really don’t know where they got that result; the best guess seems to be that they’re assuming that former spending on imports just goes away, which is not a good assumption.

Note that this is coming from someone who doesn’t seem to take the upside to Trump’s proposed policies very seriously; he’s just not that frightened of the (in his view, small) downside.

More importantly, the Moody’s report doesn’t pay any attention to the economic benefits of relocating production to the U.S. A nation that runs a chronic trade deficit, as we do, is eschewing domestic production in favor of letting foreigners produce for it in exchange for a) debt and b) sale of existing assets. Producing for ourselves instead would, by basic economic definitions, be an increase in U.S. GDP.

Since our trade deficit is around $500 billion a year, this is not a minor issue. (Anyone who’s still buying into the “trade deficits don’t matter / aren’t real money” delusion, let’s go over that one more time.)

Zeroing out the U.S. trade deficit would also reduce unemployment. Or, more likely, bring back people who have dropped out of the labor force entirely - a huge problem that has enabled us to have nominally low unemployment numbers because people who aren’t looking for work aren’t counted. This, in turn, would increase Federal tax revenue as people started paying income tax again, and reduce the cost of unemployment benefits. So it’s a very virtuous cycle.

The Moody’s report makes a number of really odd assumptions. For example,

But although Mr. Trump is uncomfortable with NAFTA and the WTO-based trade relationship with China, it is assumed that they are not materially changed.

Now I can’t tell you exactly what changes a President Trump would make, but it’s pretty obvious that a) he wants these agreements changed, and b) because NAFTA and the WTO are treaty obligations, which the U.S. negotiated in the first place, the U.S. can renegotiate them. The obvious goal would be to end the practice of U.S. trade obligations being tools to prop open American markets for foreigners while they give us only nominal, not real, access in return.

How much traction against the trade deficit could a President Trump get? Well, since the U.S. hasn’t even been seriously trying to control its trade deficit in decades, the short answer is: definitely something.

How much would depend on what policies were used. Some of the best policies are things that Trump probably knows about, but can’t talk about because they’re politically unpalatable. For example, if the U.S. introduced a 15% border-adjustable Value-Added Tax like other developed nations have, this would a) provide big leverage against the trade deficit, and b) be absolutely, impeccably WTO-compliant, so none of the deficit-racking usual suspects (China, Japan, Germany) could do a thing about it. Such a tax could, of course, be used to finance a cut in income tax, so it could not be a net tax increase at all. But it’s still a tax, so probably toxic to Republican voters, although a national consumption tax has recently been becoming more acceptable to Republicans stymied in other avenues of tax reform.

Is Trump crazy to think he can negotiate better deals for the U.S. with foreign nations? I’m not going to offer an opinion on whether his vaunted negotiating skills will translate from Celebrity Apprentice to summitry vs. China, but I’m not the only person to have noted (like liberal economist Dean Baker below) that:

Anyhow, it would make perfect sense to negotiate a path for a higher valued yuan. At the negotiating table it would be perfectly reasonable to threaten various forms of retaliation as pressure, including tariffs.

So net-net, I can’t guarantee that Trump would be able to successfully pull off a major reform of America’s ongoing “free” trade disaster, but he would be the first president in decades pushing in the right direction and no, he’s not visibly setting us up for disaster.

### China Policies Similar

#### Both Clinton and Trump will pursue similar China policies.

Bradsher 16 — Keith Bradsher, Hong Kong Bureau Chief of *The New York Times* covering Asian business, economic, political, and science news, 2016 (“In Trade Stances Toward China, Clinton and Trump Both Signal a Chill,” *New York Times*, June 29th, Available Online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/business/international/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-trade-china.html?_r=0>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

For Asia, the bad news this week was not that Donald J. Trump detailed a seven-point plan to toughen American trade policy, especially toward China. It was that Hillary Clinton’s campaign accused Mr. Trump a few hours later of purloining her ideas, noting that she favored similar action on those issues.

A strong dose of economic populism, with an occasional sprinkling of geopolitics, has suffused the trade plans of the leading American presidential candidates this year. Vying for votes, Mr. Trump and Mrs. Clinton are each promising to do more to preserve American jobs at a time of slowing global economic growth. And China — with its vast trade, rising international influence and authoritarian government — is a natural target.

#### Trump won’t follow-through on anti-China rhetoric.

Mak 16 — Aaron Mak, Researcher at *Politico*, 2016 (“Why China’s Not Afraid of Donald J. Trump,” *Politico*, May 8th, Available Online at <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-donald-trump-china-foreign-policy-asia-beijing-213876>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

On economic issues, Trump has been much more aggressively anti-China; his tax and anti-currency manipulation proposals have even raised the prospect of a trade war. But many Chinese observers see these “tough” positions as bluster—part of Trump’s appeal to Republican voters at home—and believe he would soften his stance once in office. For one thing, his opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership—a multinational trade deal meant to counterbalance China’s economic dominance in the region—has led some in Chinese state media to believe Trump would be more open to commercial relations with China than he lets off.

A recent People’s Daily article argued further that the likelihood of Trump actually causing a crisis with China has been exaggerated by the American media. (The inevitable imprecision of translation could also be a factor, Shen points out; certain Mandarin words, such as the word for “liar,” lack the political impact of their English equivalents.)

#### This election *won’t* be different — it’s just hot air.

Bradsher 16 — Keith Bradsher, Hong Kong Bureau Chief of *The New York Times* covering Asian business, economic, political, and science news, 2016 (“In Trade Stances Toward China, Clinton and Trump Both Signal a Chill,” *New York Times*, June 29th, Available Online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/business/international/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-trade-china.html?_r=0>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

“There is no big difference from previous presidential campaigns, only more emphasis, due to the poor world trade performances” and weak global economic prospects, said He Weiwen, a co-director of the China-U.S.-E.U. Study Center at the China Association of International Trade in Beijing.

### They Say: “China Policies Similar”

#### Trump is more likely than Clinton to follow-through on anti-China policies.

Bradsher 16 — Keith Bradsher, Hong Kong Bureau Chief of *The New York Times* covering Asian business, economic, political, and science news, 2016 (“In Trade Stances Toward China, Clinton and Trump Both Signal a Chill,” *New York Times*, June 29th, Available Online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/business/international/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-trade-china.html?_r=0>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

The uncertainty for China, and much of Asia, is whether the candidates will sing the same trade tunes once in office. Mr. Trump’s confrontational approach would seem to indicate some follow-through. Mrs. Clinton seems less likely to change American policies, given that she supported President Obama’s free trade efforts during his first term of office, when she was secretary of state.

#### This year makes follow-through uniquely likely.

Bradsher 16 — Keith Bradsher, Hong Kong Bureau Chief of *The New York Times* covering Asian business, economic, political, and science news, 2016 (“In Trade Stances Toward China, Clinton and Trump Both Signal a Chill,” *New York Times*, June 29th, Available Online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/business/international/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-trade-china.html?_r=0>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Presidential candidates vow every four years to do more to help American workers facing competition from abroad. After taking office, they have consistently pursued more conciliatory trade policies toward China, seeing a strategic benefit to warm relations with Beijing.

But broad political distress this year over the loss of well-paid working class jobs to global competition, coupled with mounting concern about China’s increasingly assertive military posture, suggest that the next president could actually follow through on the pledges. If they do, the policies could pose a real predicament for China, and for other Asian countries that depend on its economy.

## U.S.-China Relations

### Clinton Better

#### Clinton is better for U.S.-China relations *despite her hawkishness*.

Moreshead 16 — Colin Moreshead, Freelance Writer based in Tokyo, M.A. Candidate in East Asian Studies at Yale University, holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies and Economics from Wesleyan University, 2016 (“Why China Might Prefer a Hawk to a Loose Cannon,” *China-U.S. Focus*—a publication of the China-United States Exchange Foundation in Hong Kong, May 18th, Available Online at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/why-china-might-prefer-a-hawk-to-a-loose-cannon/, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Heading into the general election, then, there are few appreciable differences in how Clinton and Trump would tangibly shake up the Sino-U.S. relationship in the short term. For all of Trump’s tough talk, he has yet to commit to policy prescriptions that would challenge the status quo – even his proposed 45 percent tariff has since been walked back as merely “a threat.” However, the one policy area over which Beijing is correct to express concern is Trump’s vision for East Asian regional security, and particularly his flagrant apathy with regard to nuclear non-proliferation.

At a town hall meeting held in March, Trump told CNN’s Anderson Cooper that he “would rather see Japan having some form of defense, and maybe even offense, against North Korea.” Stating that nuclear proliferation by countries like Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia was “only a matter of time,” Trump proposed multilateral armament as a means of reducing the burden of regional security on U.S. armed forces.

This shocking deviation from precedent explains why China’s government and its media will default to support for noted China-hawk Hillary Clinton. The Chinese public is somewhat familiar with Donald Trump, but primarily as an entertainer and as a businessman, while public disdain for Hillary Clinton as a politician remains. But those sentiments are baked in, and Clinton presents to Chinese politicians an undeniably superior alternative to Trump’s loose cannon: a known entity with predictable behavior who will maintain the current tenor of bilateral diplomatic dialogue.

#### Clinton will rebuild U.S.-China relations over time.

Jennings 16 — Ralph Jennings, Contributor to *Forbes* covering Taiwan and Asia, 2016 (“Fights With China Loom If Hillary Clinton Elected President,” *Forbes*, June 23rd, Available Online at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/23/fights-with-china-inevitable-if-hillary-clinton-elected-president/#29ee5d246bed>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

But after a year or two Sino-U.S. relations would probably pick up again under a Clinton presidency. China will find her predictable and her policies consistent with Obama’s, analysts believe. Each side knows that a real war, cold or hot, would hurt the economic interests of each. “From the start there might be a break-in period,” Zhao says. “After they get used to each other, then they would pay more attention to relations and handle things in a sober way. To argue, I think, is a normal situation, but if they consider interests and mostly economic interests, China and the United States will be more rational.”

\* Zhao = Zhao Xijun, deputy dean of the school of finance at Renmin University in Beijing

### Trump Better

#### Trump is better for U.S.-China relations — better foreign policy negotiations outweigh harsher economic policies.

Mak 16 — Tim Mak, Senior Correspondent for *The Daily Beast*, 2016 (“China Endorses Donald Trump,” *The Daily Beast*, April 19th, Available Online at <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/19/china-endorses-donald-trump.html>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

If Donald Trump wins the Republican nomination, his victory will be celebrated not only in Mar-a-Lago, but also in Beijing.

The Chinese Communist Party’s media conduits are swooning over the vulgar, politically-incorrect frontrunner, telegraphing that if Trump were to rise to a position of real power, it would be a boon for the country’s regional ambitions.

Chinese-language press and state media—especially foreign policy columnists—have written extensively and favorably about Trump’s geopolitical views. Many pro-Beijing writers have looked past his threats of a trade war with China, viewing his willingness to undercut America’s existing alliances in Asia as an incredible strategic opportunity.

It’s the latest twist for a politician who loves bashing the East Asian country on the campaign trail, enunciating it with his trademark flair: “Chai-Nah.” And it’s an emerging pattern of praise from America’s rivals, to include the mutual admiration society between the billionaire and Russian President Vladimir Putin. And in fact, Trump has had a lot of good things to say about dictators in the past.

One of the best examples of the apparent pro-Trump sentiment from the Chinese government is from the nationalistic Global Times, an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party. It published an article in late March, covering Trump’s rise, titled: “Trump is not a lunatic.” The article goes on with a quote that he is a “shrewd businessman” with his finger on the political pulse of his countrymen, and that the country’s mood is to slip away from “imperial hegemony.”

To be sure, some voices in the Chinese government have criticized Trump’s suggestion of a high tariff on Chinese imports. But even quasi-independent Chinese outlets are writing about the possibilities the Republican frontrunner could present to China, and, echoing his American supporters, argue that he is only putting on an act and would actually be quite flexible as president.

“Why isn’t China worried about Mr. Trump’s threat of high tariffs on their exports to the US? Because he’s also said he’s a deal-maker. They think they can make a deal to preserve what they have in the US-China relationship while a Trump administration retreats from world economic leadership,” Derek Scissors, a resident scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, told The Daily Beast.

Caixin, a media organization in China, has done just that: dismissing the threat of a tariff, arguing that Trump’s positions and principles are constantly changing, and that the billionaire is a realist, much like Henry Kissinger.

Between Trump and Hillary Clinton, the article continues, Trump may be a better choice because he is a negotiator rather than a hardened ideologue—and certainly he would be better than the “hostile” attitude that President George W. Bush had toward China.

“The Chinese media has made statements that are more friendly to Trump than one might expect, and more friendly to Trump than Hillary Clinton if it came up between the two,” said Jennifer Harris, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who is also an informal unpaid adviser to the Hillary Clinton campaign. There is, Harris said, a “comfort” with Trump among the Chinese media, which are heavily influenced by the government’s position.

Trump has indicated an openness toward undercutting existing American global alliances, arguing in public comments that he would be willing to withdraw American forces from Japan and South Korea unless those allies increase their payments to cover costs.

“We cannot afford to be losing vast amounts of billions of dollars on all of this,” Trump told The New York Times.

This has drawn alarm from Tokyo and Seoul, but the Chinese press has covered these developments with great detail and enthusiasm, savoring the panic that their Asian rivals are enduring as Trump suggests a renegotiation with American allies the region.

“China’s great project is to try to undermine America’s alliances in Asia. And if you have someone in the White House that says this is open to negotiation… that’s really good news in Beijing,” Harris said.

#### Clinton hurts U.S.-China relations — she’s a committed hawk.

Reynolds 15 — Ben Reynolds, Writer and Foreign Policy Analyst based in New York whose commentary has appeared in *The Diplomat*, *Russia Today*, and *AAJ*, 2015 (“What Would a Clinton Presidency Mean for U.S.-China Relations?,” *China-U.S. Focus*—a publication of the China-United States Exchange Foundation in Hong Kong, April 27th, Available Online at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/what-would-a-clinton-presidency-mean-for-u-s-china-relations/, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Hillary Clinton’s announcement that she intends to run for president in 2016 has reignited speculation about what a Clinton presidency would mean for U.S.-China relations. As the U.S. Secretary of State from 2009 to 2013 and the face of the “Pivot to Asia,” Clinton had a history of often antagonistic interactions with China. Clinton would enter office with an established perspective on the nature of U.S.-China relations and a well-known personal style in international diplomacy. Given that her perspective and style have already angered Chinese officials, Clinton would have to perform a complete about-face to reset relations. None of this bodes well for the U.S.-China relationship.

Understanding the impact of a potential Clinton presidency is crucial in predicting the future of U.S.-China relations, as she is by far the most likely candidate to win. Clinton has a significant lead over any prospective rival in name recognition and, more importantly, funding. There are no other candidates in the Democratic Party with Clinton’s level of institutional power, and she will probably not face any serious challengers in the primary. In the general election, Clinton will have an advantage over her Republican opponent due to the simple fact that she will probably raise more money. Generational demographic shifts appear to also favor Democratic candidates in presidential elections. While most political analysts insist that it is too early to predict who will win in 2016, there is a very high chance that Hillary Clinton will be the next president of the United States.

Assuming Hillary Clinton wins the presidency in 2016, we can expect a foreign policy that is quite similar to what she advocated in the Obama administration. In short, this foreign policy will be interventionist and will rely heavily on military might. Clinton pushed heavily for U.S. intervention in Libya to topple the Qaddafi regime. She was also one of the loudest voices in favor of early intervention in the Syrian civil war. Clinton argued as early as 2012 that the administration should train and equip Syrian rebels in order to remove Bashar al-Assad from power. While the administration ultimately heeded Clinton’s advice on both counts, it is important to note that she was among the most consistent interventionist voices in the Obama White House.

Hillary Clinton and her aides were largely responsible for directing the Obama administration’s Asia policy until her departure in 2013. The Pivot to Asia was the hallmark initiative of Clinton’s tenure. Clinton authored a widely read article in Foreign Policy announcing the pivot strategy, arguing that the United States had to refocus its attention from the Middle East to Asia to cement the U.S.’s position in the global order. Though the military dimension of the pivot flopped due to budgetary constraints, Clinton initially envisioned a “comprehensive” strategy, including a strong military component. Chinese officials and policymakers interpreted the Pivot as an attempt to contain China’s legitimate rise. This, in addition to Clinton’s propensity to criticize the Chinese government at international gatherings, has not made her particularly popular in China.

Clinton’s pool of likely appointees is equally problematic for the future of U.S.-China relations. Many of the Clinton administration’s political appointees will probably be drawn from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). CNAS was founded in 2007, largely to serve as hawkish and pro-interventionist think tank aligned with the Democratic Party. Michelle Flournoy, its co-founder, was a political appointee in the first Clinton administration. Hillary Clinton delivered the keynote address at CNAS’s official launch. Clinton-CNAS ties run deep, and it is no accident that both heavily focus on the strategic importance of Asia to the United States.

Unfortunately for those who might hope for an accommodation between the U.S. and China, CNAS fellows often press for ill-considered military options to counter Chinese assertiveness. For instance, Elbridge Colby and Ely Ratner, both CNAS fellows, have argued that the United States should “elevate the risks” of Chinese actions in disputed areas by increasing the likelihood of a U.S. military response. Colby and Ratner state that the U.S. should prepare to use force in response to “coercion” from Chinese Coast Guard vessels. They also hold that the U.S. must prepare for a major war with China and deepen its military ties with Japan. While each of these recommendations is supposedly aimed to deter aggression, China would probably see them as naked coercion. A “risk elevation” strategy would seriously strain U.S.-China relations and increase the possibility of a serious conflict.

Colby and Ratner suffer from the delusion that the United States can avert the reality of shifting power relations between the U.S. and China by acting more aggressively. A White House with advisers like Colby and Ratner might come dangerously close to provoking a dramatic military confrontation with China. I see little reason to believe that the prospect of escalation alone will be enough to deter China from a high-stakes conflict in its own backyard. Nor is China likely to simply acquiesce to continued U.S. dominance in the Asia-Pacific because the U.S. alters its rules of engagement. Unfortunately, these fallacious notions are quite common in U.S. policy-making circles.

#### Trump is better for U.S.-China relations.

Harner 16 — Stephen M. Harner, President of Yangtze Century Ltd.—an investment and consulting firm in China and Japan, former U.S. Foreign Service Officer at the U.S. Department of State who served in Beijing and Tokyo, former Vice President of Citibank, former Chief Representative at Deutsche Bank-Shanghai, holds an M.A. in International Economics from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2016 (“Why Donald Trump Will Be Better for U.S.-China Relations than Marco Rubio or Hillary Clinton,” *China-U.S. Focus*—a publication of the China-United States Exchange Foundation in Hong Kong, March 10th, Available Online at <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/why-donald-trump-will-be-better-for-u-s-china-relations-than-marco-rubio-or-hillary-clinton/>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Following important endorsements and key wins on “Super Tuesday” March 1, Donald Trump is by far the most likely person to be nominated at the July 18-21 Republican convention, and to face off against Hillary Clinton on November 8.

What should people concerned with U.S.-China relations, especially those hoping U.S.-China relations can be improved, be thinking about this eventuality? What should they know and consider about the man who is probably the only viable remaining challenger to Trump, Florida Senator Marco Rubio?

I will state my view up front: Between Trump, Clinton, and Rubio, it is Donald Trump who offers the greatest promise for improving U.S.-China relations, both in the short- and long-terms. Hillary Clinton would surely continue the same confrontational and biased anti-China policies stances (e.g., on South China Sea sovereignty questions) that characterized her tenure as Secretary of State. Marco Rubio, a representative and surrogate of the vested bureaucratic, political, and industrial interests of the America’s national security state, would, like Clinton, continue the anti-China policy bias and, if anything, accelerate the potentially catastrophic and totally unjustifiable drift toward U.S.-China military confrontation in the South China Sea and elsewhere.

Most readers will find my opinion on Trump incomprehensible. Has not Trump asserted that China has achieved unfair advantage in trade and economic relations with the United States? Has not Trump threatened to impose tariffs or other barriers to Chinese goods? Has not Trump declared that he would bring back thousands of American jobs lost to China?

Readers will be raising these questions because they (like most commentators within the political establishment in the United States, who failed utterly to understand Trump’s appeal and predicted that his campaign would quickly collapse) are missing the essence and implications of Donald Trump’s positions on America’s foreign policies and relations, in trade and, more importantly, national security.

One analyst who, on the contrary, understands Trump’s appeal, and has thought deeply about why Trump is so fiercely opposed by both the Republican and Democrat political establishments, is David Stockman, former Republican Congressman, Reagan-era director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, and now, at age 69, Wall Street financier who produces the very engaging and provocative “David Stockman’s Contra Corner” blog.

Stockman believes Trump’s comments about disadvantageous trade deals and economic policies are stylistic simplifications, unlikely to be translated into policies, meant mainly to adumbrate his underlying, fundamental position and belief that the United States government, led by a self-interested elite of both parties, has since the end of WWII sacrificed the interests of the vast majority of American citizens, in order to maintain what can only be described as a global “empire.”

Trump is signaling that he believes maintaining this global American empire has weakened and corrupted the United States, without substantially improving conditions in much of the world. On the contrary, America’s interventions and determination to wield hegemonic power have created chaos in and visited devastation on other countries, while engendering unnecessary and unjustifiable confrontations, for example with Russia.

Trump’s way of thinking suggests that he would see no reason to continue the provocative Obama policy of challenging China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea. Indeed, there is a good chance that a Trump presidency would see reversal of the Obama/Hillary Clinton “pivot to Asia” strategy, the aim of which is to maintain unchallengeable military hegemony in the region, effectively threatening China’s legitimate security interests.

### They Say: “Trump Kills Relations”

#### Trump *won’t* kill relations — China will take the high road for economic reasons.

Bremmer 16 — Ian Bremmer, President and Founder of Eurasia Group—a global political risk research and consulting firm, Global Research Professor at New York University, Founding Chairman of the Global Agenda Council on Geopolitical Risk at the World Economic Forum, Harold J. Newman Distinguished Fellow in Geopolitics at the Asia Society Policy Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University, 2016 (“Trump and the World: What Could Actually Go Wrong,” *Politico*, June 3rd, Available Online at <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/2016-donald-trump-international-foreign-policy-global-risk-security-guide-213936>, Accessed 07-05-2016)

Red Herrings: What Not To Worry About

1. U.S.-China relations

There is considerable fear that Trump’s anti-China rhetoric will ratchet up tension with a nation that could be our most dangerous rival, militarily and economically. But this doesn’t pose the risk you might think. The next president, Trump or Clinton, will have two advantages in U.S. relations with China, the world’s most important bilateral relationship. First, China’s leaders are now focused on a complex, high-stakes economic reform process, one designed to transition from an inefficient export-based economy to a more innovative and resilient model powered mainly by domestic consumption. Success depends on Beijing’s ability to avoid conflicts that are bad for business, even those concocted by a U.S. president who wants to shake things up. Second, the expected slowdown in Chinese economic growth looks to be under control, and President Xi Jinping appears confident in his hold on power. Trump’s campaign assertion that Japan and South Korea should take greater responsibility for their own security will increase that confidence. This gives him less incentive to create an artificial foreign policy emergency to divert public attention from domestic problems.

President Trump will make a point of antagonizing China, particularly on trade and investment relations, but Chinese officials can afford to respond by taking the high road on most points of potential conflict to try to convince other governments that Washington, not Beijing, is the cause of trouble in U.S.-China relations. Trump will sometimes spoil for a fight, but Xi appears unlikely to give him one under any but the most extraordinary circumstances.

### Irrelevant (General)

#### Neither candidate is better for U.S.-China relations.

Dingli 16 — Shen Dingli, Professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, Founder and Director of China’s first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and Regional Security at Fudan University, holds a Ph.D. in Physics from Fudan University, 2016 (“The U.S. Electorate and China,” *China-U.S. Focus*—a publication of the China-United States Exchange Foundation in Hong Kong, May 24th, Available Online at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-electorate-and-china/, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Many in the world are thinking about the impact each candidate would have if he or she will become the president. Surely Trump is much different from Clinton, so President Trump or President Clinton would bring his/her different style of governance into the government. At this time, it is premature to suggest who is better or worse for this country.

Since China is fast developing, Beijing is increasingly becoming more important in stabilizing Sino-US relations. Unlike what it did in the past three decades to integrate into the world, China is now proposing ways to improve international institutions. With this in mind, it is not that important who is elected as the President of the US.

The opposite could be true – whoever is elected will have to follow the fundamentals in conducting US-China relations, by expanding mutual and global goods including a more fair and convenient trading system, and a safer and more secure international environment. China and the US have much at stake if they would sustain a cooperative partnership.

#### U.S.-China relations will be low no matter who wins.

TAI 16 — The American Interest, 2016 (“U.S.–China Economic Relations Continue to Sour,” June 17th, Available Online at <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/06/17/u-s-china-economic-relations-continue-to-sour/>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew isn’t happy with Beijing’s anti-competitive policies. The WSJ reports:

“We continue to raise concerns about the general climate in China for U.S. businesses,” Mr. Lew said Thursday at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank. “They need the innovation that comes from foreign companies, they need the economic activity that comes from foreign companies, and they’re going to have to make a choice on how they manage this set of obstacles.”

Of those obstacles, he added, “some are formal in the form of laws, and some are informal in the form of bureaucratic complexity.”

Mr. Lew’s relatively strong criticism on business conditions contrasts with his more favorable view of other, more successful economic engagement with China in the past seven years.

Zhu Haiquan, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said the “Chinese government is fully engaged in an all-round reform which will also serve as a strong guarantee for an improved foreign investment environment in China.”

Public criticism from Lew points to an ominous trend. In the past, the economic relationship between China and the U.S. has been strong enough to offset political disputes. Increasingly, that is not the case on the U.S. side. Companies doing business outside China are struggling to compete with China’s heavily-subsidized enterprises. Meanwhile, companies doing business inside China have been complaining about a stifling regulatory environment. On Friday, Apple was told it may have to stop selling the latest model of the iPhone because of alleged copyright infringement.

Whether Clinton or Trump wins in November, it appears that U.S.-China relations will be on a downhill slide and that the American business community will be less likely to rush to China’s defense.

#### Relations will be low regardless of who wins.

Jennings 16 — Ralph Jennings, Contributor to *Forbes* covering Taiwan and Asia, 2016 (“Fights With China Loom If Hillary Clinton Elected President,” *Forbes*, June 23rd, Available Online at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/23/fights-with-china-inevitable-if-hillary-clinton-elected-president/#29ee5d246bed>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

China and the United States need each other as the world’s two superpowers. They trade, they invest in each other’s economies, they work together on global security matters. Then again they fight sometimes. If Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party’s likely nominee for U.S. president, wins the election in November, expect at the start more fighting than working together.

There’s always a warm-up period with China when a new U.S. president takes power regardless of who or which party, notes Zhao Xijun, deputy dean of the school of finance at Renmin University in Beijing. The two sides also face a list of stubborn issues, such as what to do with unpredictable, reclusive North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and whether the United States arms Vietnam. China wants North Korea in its pocket for regional security but U.S. leaders want to end the regime. A better armed Vietnam could threaten China as the two are old rivals with a shared border.

“The U.S.-China relationship no matter who’s elected is going through some tough times,” says Alexander Huang, strategic studies professor at Tamkang University in Taiwan. “There are things on the agenda that will surely bring about quarrels.”

#### It doesn’t matter who wins – tensions will remain high.

Reynolds 15 — Ben Reynolds, Writer and Foreign Policy Analyst based in New York whose commentary has appeared in *The Diplomat*, *Russia Today*, and *AAJ*, 2015 (“What Would a Clinton Presidency Mean for U.S.-China Relations?,” *China-U.S. Focus*—a publication of the China-United States Exchange Foundation in Hong Kong, April 27th, Available Online at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/what-would-a-clinton-presidency-mean-for-u-s-china-relations/, Accessed 07-04-2016)

A Clinton administration will lean interventionist, but there is no reason to believe that the next election will fundamentally alter the U.S.’s foreign policy priorities. While a change of diplomatic style might be expected, even seasoned analysts will be hard pressed to find a significant divergence between the Obama administration’s foreign policy and the policy of a Clinton administration. As long as U.S. policymakers believe that hegemony in the Asia-Pacific is a worthwhile aim, disagreements over the nature of U.S. strategy will remain quite marginal. Elections rarely change the fundamental interests of states.

Chinese distrust of Hillary Clinton will not be a boon to U.S.-China relations. Clinton’s hawkish tendencies will likely exacerbate tensions. But the fundamental sources of friction between the U.S. and China remain the same no matter who sits in the Oval Office. Absent a new accommodation to match the shifting balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, the rivalry between the U.S. and China will continue to deepen for the foreseeable future.

### Irrelevant (BIT)

#### A Clinton win won’t save the BIT — it’s dead.

Jennings 16 — Ralph Jennings, Contributor to *Forbes* covering Taiwan and Asia, 2016 (“Fights With China Loom If Hillary Clinton Elected President,” *Forbes*, June 23rd, Available Online at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/23/fights-with-china-inevitable-if-hillary-clinton-elected-president/#29ee5d246bed>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Clinton, former secretary of state under President Barack Obama, has addled China before. Chinese leaders might recall her speech at the UN Fourth World Congress on Women in Beijing in 1995 and her “challenge to China on that occasion,” says Alan Romberg, East Asia Program director with Washington think tank the Stimson Center. Fifteen years later Chinese leaders noted her speech at a Southeast Asian regional ministerial meeting where the United States “led a string of foreign ministers in criticizing China’s policies in the region,” Romberg says. The Communist leadership also sees Clinton as part of Obama’s 2011 pivot to Asia, which Beijing felt was aimed at containing China’s growth. “Overall, indeed, they tend to see her as holding to a generally tough line on China overall,” Romberg says.

Criticism of China’s policies in the region is forecast to continue through her campaign and into the early part of her presidency. She would question Beijing’s militarization of the South China Sea and bolster support for Southeast Asian governments with overlapping maritime claims, a boost for countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Clinton’s populist pro-USA campaign talk about the hazards of foreign trade deals including the 12-nation Trans Pacific Partnership could also hurt prospects for a U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty, a platform to offer each side more market access, says Alicia Garcia Herrero, chief Asia economist with French investment bank Natixis. That agreement, “under negotiation for so long, is probably dead,” Garcia says.

### China Likes Trump

#### China prefers Trump — he’ll negotiate and he doesn’t care about the SCS.

DiChristopher 16 — Tom DiChristopher, Web and TV Producer for CNBC, internally citing Leland Miller, President of China Beige Book International—the world's leading data analytics firm focusing on the Chinese economy, Member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, recipient of the Gerald Segal Fellowship Prize in Asian Security—a prize awarded annually to a single individual worldwide by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, holds a J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law, an M.A. in Chinese History from Oxford University (St. Antony’s College), and a Graduate Chinese Language Fellowship from Tunghai University (Taiwan), 2016 (“China may prefer Trump to Clinton, says China Beige Book president,” *CNBC*, June 30th, Available Online at <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/30/china-may-prefer-trump-to-clinton-says-china-beige-book-president.html>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

The Chinese people may prefer Donald Trump to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton despite the presumptive Republican presidential nominee's repeated threats to impose tariffs on China, according to Leland Miller, president of China Beige Book International.

Many Americans think the Chinese hate Trump because of his anti-China rhetoric, Miller said. But he thinks the Chinese see the real estate developer and reality TV star as "an interesting opportunity."

"I think a lot of people in China, they see Donald Trump, they see this negotiator. They say, Hillary Clinton, we know she's going to be mean to us. Donald Trump wants to make a deal. He doesn't care about the South China Sea. He may not know where it is," Miller told CNBC's "Squawk Box" on Thursday.

#### China prefers Trump — they think he’ll give them the upper hand.

Mak 16 — Aaron Mak, Researcher at *Politico*, 2016 (“Why China’s Not Afraid of Donald J. Trump,” *Politico*, May 8th, Available Online at <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-donald-trump-china-foreign-policy-asia-beijing-213876>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

If you’ve been paying any attention to Trump’s rhetoric on the campaign trail, you might imagine China would be quaking in its boots. Rarely has a candidate so relentlessly attacked a peaceful trade partner. Trump has accused China of manipulating its currency and stealing American jobs, and promised a 45 percent tariff on all Chinese goods—intended to devastate the country’s export-driven economy. He has even tweeted far more about China than about any other of his favorite foreign nemeses like Mexico or ISIS.

These attacks have worried economists, diplomats and free-trade advocates. But one group that seems surprisingly sanguine is the Chinese people.

Even as China’s government has refused to comment on Trump’s diatribes, a survey of both official state media and social media networks reveals that a growing contingent of Chinese believe the mogul’s potential presidency could actually end up benefiting China—perhaps more so than a President Hillary Clinton, whose criticism of the country’s human rights record infuriates Chinese leaders. Some Chinese admire Trump’s glitzy businesses, big-name brand and candid personality. Others genuinely think the candidate’s “America First” foreign policy positions would give China the upper hand in Sino-American relations and allow more room for China to assert itself on the world stage.

#### The Chinese love Trump’s brand — he’s extremely popular.

Mak 16 — Aaron Mak, Researcher at *Politico*, 2016 (“Why China’s Not Afraid of Donald J. Trump,” *Politico*, May 8th, Available Online at <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-donald-trump-china-foreign-policy-asia-beijing-213876>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

It didn’t start out this way. In the early days of the campaign, government-run news outlets tended to paint Trump as “a buffoon or a joke,” as Xincheng Shen, a U.S.-based writer for state-managed news site The Paper, told me. But as Trump has racked up more primary wins and asserted his foreign policy positions, China’s state outlets have grown more receptive. Among layman pundits on Chinese social media, the support has been even stronger. On Weibo, the candidate has inspired popular groups such as “Trump Fan Club” and “Great Man Donald Trump.” In a late March poll of 3,330 Global Times readers, 54 percent of respondents said they supported a Trump presidency—well above the roughly 40 percent of Americans who currently do.

“Trump is very, very popular among Chinese Internet users,” says Kecheng Fang, a former reporter in China who now researches Chinese media at the University of Pennsylvania.

Much of the Trump support in China boils down to his reputation overseas as a shrewd entrepreneur—an image that surely resonates with China’s plutocrats and aspirers. (“China today has this obsession with successful businessmen,” Shen notes.) Over the past decade, the Trump brand has been making inroads in the Chinese market, with the mogul promoting his Southeast Asia and U.S. luxury hotels specifically to Chinese travelers, in addition to looking for new locations in Beijing, Shenzhen and Shanghai. Trump himself has boasted about doing business with Chinese companies and leasing real estate to Chinese patrons. “I do great with China. I sell them condos. I have the largest bank in the world from China, the largest in the world by far,” he claimed last week. “They’re a tenant of mine in a building I own in Manhattan.”

Trump’s reality TV show, The Apprentice, also has a following in China, as does his daughter, Ivanka Trump, whose high-life-oriented Weibo account has 15,000 fans. The image of success and opulence that Trump cultivates has even led some Chinese businesses to coopt his surname—from the luxury toilet seat manufacturer Shenzhen Trump Industries to the Henan real estate firm Trump Consulting to the Anhui air purifier producer Trump Electronics.

#### China prefers Trump on foreign policy — he’s a pragmatist who will pivot the U.S. military *away* from Asia.

Mak 16 — Aaron Mak, Researcher at *Politico*, 2016 (“Why China’s Not Afraid of Donald J. Trump,” *Politico*, May 8th, Available Online at <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-donald-trump-china-foreign-policy-asia-beijing-213876>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Beyond just Trump’s brand, many Chinese believe his business acumen would translate into political pragmatism on matters of national security and foreign policy—which would play to China’s advantage. Trump has repeatedly questioned the wisdom of maintaining American military bases and warships in the region, arguing that they cost the United States money while allowing allies like Japan to mooch off American support in their squabbles with China in the East and South China seas. “If we’re attacked, they do not have to come to our defense,” Trump told the New York Times in late March. “If they’re attacked, we have to come totally to their defense. And that is a—that’s a real problem.”

Chinese state media have responded favorably to this rhetoric; China clearly sees U.S. armed forces in the area as a nuisance, if not a threat, and with American and Chinese warships patrolling the same crowded waterways, the two countries have been playing a risky game of chicken. A Global Times op-ed published a day after Trump’s Times interview reads, “It is hence predictable that if Trump is elected president, he will choose to cooperate with China, from which Japan will fail to benefit.”

That leaves room for China to assert itself. An article published last month in the People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s official newspaper, noted that Trump’s snubs toward America’s Asian allies, namely Japan and South Korea, will allow China to become the dominant military power in the Pacific. Because the South China Sea isn’t oil rich, a Trump-led military would likely turn its attention away from Asia and toward the Middle East, says Shen, who last month published a widely circulated article in The Paper headlined “Do Not Rush to Say Trump Is Crazy.” “It seems like [Trump] only wants to get involved in something militarily when there is a business benefit,” Shen argues.

### China Hates Clinton

#### China hates Clinton because of the pivot.

Mak 16 — Aaron Mak, Researcher at *Politico*, 2016 (“Why China’s Not Afraid of Donald J. Trump,” *Politico*, May 8th, Available Online at <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-donald-trump-china-foreign-policy-asia-beijing-213876>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Part of the reason for Trump’s appeal in China has to do with China’s intense skepticism toward the prospect of a Hillary Clinton presidency. The “pivot to Asia”—a push during Clinton’s tenure as secretary of state to increase America’s military presence and advance human rights in the region—has long been a source of anxiety for the Chinese, who see it as an attempt by the United States to control and suppress China’s rise. That policy, which Chinese associate closely with Clinton, has caused “dissatisfaction among Chinese netizens,” Wu Xinbo, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, recently told the Global Times, “while Trump’s outspokenness and straightforwardness have gained him more support.”

#### China hates Clinton because of human rights criticisms. To them, Trump is preferable.

Mak 16 — Aaron Mak, Researcher at *Politico*, 2016 (“Why China’s Not Afraid of Donald J. Trump,” *Politico*, May 8th, Available Online at <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-donald-trump-china-foreign-policy-asia-beijing-213876>, Accessed 07-04-2016)

Clinton has also criticized China for human rights violations and online censorship since her days as first lady and later at Foggy Bottom, leading some Chinese netizens and state media outlets to believe she would be more ideological and less flexible than Trump in diplomatic dealings with China. “Unlike traditional idealistic politicians, who tend to place ideological values, such as democracy and human rights, as the priority in their diplomacy, Trump has more realistic interests in mind,” a recent op-ed in the Global Times says.

In fact, Trump’s apparently pliable views on human rights (he has expressed interest in bringing back torture, for one) and disregard for traditional bounds of discussion in American politics have helped him win fans from the more nationalistic corners of Chinese social media. In China, a strain of Islamophobia has emerged in response to both terror attacks abroad and outrage at Chinese affirmative-action policies that favor Muslim students in the scoring of the gaokao, the standardized college entrance exam. “Many Chinese share Trump’s anti-Muslim and anti-political-correctness sentiment,” says Fang, who has followed Trump-related discussions on Zhihu, China’s Quora equivalent. One particularly popular Zhihu post in support of Trump’s policy to ban Muslims from entering the United States reads, “A Western civilization dominated by political correctness is […] doomed to die.” The post received almost 10,000 upvotes.